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In 2008, the Polish Medical Air Rescue started replacing its fleet with modern EC135 machines. To ensure the maximum
possible safety of the missions performed both in the period of implementing the change and later on, the management
prepared a strategy of training its crews to use the new type of helicopter. The analysis of incidents that occurred during
2006–2009 showed that both the human and the technical factors must be carefully considered. Moreover, a risk analysis was
conducted to reduce the risk both during general crew training and in the course of particular flight operations. A four-stage
strategy of training pilots and crew members was worked out by weighing up all the risks. The analysis of data from 2010
to 2013 confirmed that the risk connected with flying and with all the activities involved in direct support aircraft operations
is under control and lowered to an acceptable level.
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1. Introduction
The main aim of the government program for replacing the
fleet of Emergency Medical Service (EMS) helicopters in
Poland was to fulfill the duties resulting from European
flight regulations which specify the technical requirements
for the aircraft used by EMS operators in European Union
countries, which were no longer met by Mi-2 plus heli-
copters. The second aim was to increase the operation
capabilities of the Helicopter Emergency Medical Service
(HEMS) in the area of performing aviation tasks using
the new type of helicopter. The technical and operational
requirements described in European flight regulations com-
prise a system that must be met by both the helicopter and
the crew to minimize the risk resulting from performing
rescue flights in an environment which is unknown and,
therefore, unsafe (e.g., flights to accidents which are differ-
ent each time, operations in the mountains, or at night).
After using Mi-2 plus helicopters for almost 30 years,
the process of replacing the Polish Medical Air Rescue
(PMAR) fleet with more modern EC135 machines started
in 2008. To ensure the maximum level of safety during the
missions performed both in the transition period and in the
course of later operations, the management of the company
started preparing a strategy of training HEMS crews for the
new type of helicopter. Such a strategy involves not only
the technical aspects of the pilot’s work, the manual for
which is obtained when purchasing a new helicopter and
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implementing its use, but also a number of other significant
undertakings which must be performed to reach a satisfac-
tory level of preparing crews for independent operations
connected with rescuing human life and health. Although
many flight operators in the world use helicopters of this
kind, none has hitherto predicted as radical a difference
in the level of technology as the one which took place in
Poland. This is why transferring foreign training patterns to
Polish conditions would not meet the requirements posed
by the rapid preparation of Polish pilots and air crews for
operating the new type of helicopter. Moreover, under Pol-
ish conditions, EMS services were of a specific character
because only one type of helicopter had been used for
years, which was radically different in its technology from
the newly purchased machines. Such a situation called
for preparing a specifically Polish type of training course,
and implementing specific organizational and operational
solutions before introducing the new helicopters.
The basic challenge that had to be met while developing
the training strategy was – paradoxically – the extremely
rich experience of HEMS crews, which comprised hun-
dreds and even thousands of work hours. This is because
the technology used in the Mi-2 plus technologies came
from the 1970s, while EC135 is a modern, complicated
machine with the latest technical solutions that are now
used in aviation. The EC135 has been designed for the
needs of medical rescue services. It is equipped with the
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necessary medical devices for saving human life and health
and a new system of loading the patient on board. Mod-
ern solutions in the main rotor and its decreased diameter
make it possible for the machine to land in more difficult
terrain, both during the day and at night. Modern aviation
means using multi-function display screens in the cock-
pit; a device warning of the approach of other aircraft;
an autopilot co-functioning with other devices; a weather
radar; full authority digital engine control; a flight manage-
ment system integrated with a moving map display, global
positioning system, and emergency locator transmitter; an
enhanced vision system making night vision possible by
means of a camera installed under the helicopter; and
instrument flight rules.
In this situation, experienced HEMS pilots and crew
members were forced to abandon the fixed work patterns
acquired over many years and learn new procedures. The
transfer from analog pilot and navigational systems avail-
able in the Mi-2 plus helicopter to the very advanced
electronic systems of the new chopper was connected with
a risk that had to be minimized.[1]
2. Developing training strategy: assumptions
The main factors determining the safety of an aircraft
carrier are worked out by considering the number of acci-
dents and their causes. Before making assumptions for
the purchase of new PMAR helicopters, the accidents
involving Mi-2 helicopters over the past 4 years of using
them, i.e., during 2006–2009, were analyzed. Drawing the
correct conclusions from such a study is possible if the
analysis diagnoses the system of human factor–machine–
surroundings. In such an analysis, the human is referred
to as the decision-maker and operator. There is no place
here for the task to be met. What is studied is the following
sequence: the human activates the machine, which in turn
impacts the surroundings to obtain the desired objective (a
change of location, etc.).[2,3]
The results of the analysis are presented in Tables 1–4
and in Figure 1. The groups of causes leading to flight
incidents are specified in accordance with the Annex to
Order No. 14 issued by the President of the Civil Aviation
Authority.[4]
An analysis of data presented in Tables 1–4 and in
Figure 1 showed that human-related and technological
factors constituted the basic causes of flight incidents
and should, therefore, be particularly emphasized in the
training strategy. As far as the human-related factor is
concerned, procedural errors turned out to be especially
frequent. Errors of this kind are connected with non-
observation of flight procedures and regulations. They
were identified as a particularly significant factor gener-
ating dangerous situations in PMAR operations, which
concern not only flying personnel but are committed in
such areas as technology, the environment, and organiza-
tion. Regulations specify such concepts as ‘unintentionally
Table 1. Groups of causes leading to aviation incidents in
the human factor (H) category and the number of incidents
during 2006–2009.
Number of incidents
Code Cause 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
H1 Intended action 0 0 0 0 0
H2 Lack of
qualifications
0 0 0 1 1
H3 Errors in
communication
0 0 0 0 0
H4 Procedural errors 2 1 3 5 11
H5 Ineptness 0 0 0 0 0
Total 12
Table 2. Groups of causes leading to aviation incidents in
the technical factor (T) category and the number of incidents
during 2006–2009.
Number of incidents
Code Cause 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
T1 Serious engine failure,
engine fire, damage
to the surface of the
balloon, damage
to the canopy or
harness of the
parachute
0 0 0 0 0
T2 Engine failure or
damage, fire signal,
damaged balloon,
damage to the
canopy or harness of
the parachute
1 0 1 0 2
T3 Landing gear and tires 3 1 1 0 5
T4 Flight controls 0 0 0 0 0
T5 Construction damage 0 2 0 0 2
T6 Fire, smoke (in crew
cabin, passenger
cabin, or hold)
0 0 0 0 0
T7 Unauthorized
modifications,
counterfeit spare
parts
0 0 0 0 0
T8 Radio equipment and
devices
1 2 4 0 7
T9 Construction and
production faults
1 4 3 0 8
T10 Autopilot/flight
management
systems
0 0 0 0 0
T11 Faulty hydraulic
system(s)
1 1 1 1 4
T12 Others 0 3 1 1 5
Total 33
departing from observing procedures or regulations.’[4]
Most human-related errors are unintended and result from
a series of coincidences that are conducive to committing
a mistake.
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Table 3. Groups of causes leading to aviation incidents in
the organizational (O) factor category and the number of
incidents during 2006–2009.
Number of incidents
Code Cause 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
O1 Safety management 0 0 0 0 0
O2 Training system 0 0 0 0 0
O3 Standards, inspections,
audits
0 0 0 0 0
O4 Operation of cabin
crew
0 0 0 0 0
O5 Operation of ground
crew
0 0 0 0 0
O6 Technology and
equipment
0 0 0 0 0
O7 Operation planning 0 0 0 0 0
O8 Management changes 0 0 0 0 0
O9 System of selection 0 0 0 0 0
O10 Technical service 0 0 1 1 2
O11 Shipping, dispatch 0 0 0 0 0
O12 Others 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2
Table 4. Groups of causes leading to aviation incidents
in the environmental (E) factor category and the number of
incidents during 2006–2009.
Number of incidents
Code Cause 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
E1 Meteorological 0 0 0 1 1
E2 Air traffic control
services
0 0 0 0 0
E3 Birds, animals,
other foreign
objects
1 1 1 3 6
E4 Airport services,
ground services
0 0 0 0 0
E5 Navigational aids 0 0 0 0 0
E6 Security 0 0 0 0 0
E7 Supervision of
observing
regulations
0 0 0 0 0
E8 Others 0 0 0 2 2
Total 9
Most unintended incidents, particularly aviation acci-
dents, stem from a combination of a series of contributing
events and circumstances called an error chain.[5] The
training strategy adopted was therefore based on a systemic
approach to the problem, in particular a holistic view of
flight safety,[6] as illustrated in Figure 2.
An analysis of the factors included in the safety chain
(Figure 2) made it possible to develop detailed areas of
indispensable training arising from the specifics of the new
type of helicopter, such as pilot training, avionics, technical
and operational parameters, and ground maintenance.
Figure 1. Aviation incidents during 2006–2009 by groups of
causes.
In the course of developing the training strategy for the
new helicopter, it was assumed that the main objectives
of the courses determining the kind of appropriate training
model and appropriate syllabus were as follows:
• planning and carrying out courses which would
train HEMS crews to fly the new helicopter taking
into consideration the need to make the necessary
technological jump (leapfrogging);
• eliminating unfavorable habits acquired in the
course of flying the old generation of helicopters;
• mastering the new technological solutions used in
EC135 helicopters in a way ensuring their safe
operation; and
• enhancing the safety of HEMS crews when carry-
ing out their missions by means of team work and
training courses conducted jointly with other EMS
units.
For practical reasons, and due to the planned multi-stage
character of the training process, a systemic training model
was adopted.[7] Its stage 1, comprising a needs analysis,
has a significant impact on the course taken by the train-
ing. It includes conclusions from the actions and analyses
that had so far been taken and influences the syllabus and
methodology of the entire curriculum. In this model, an
important role is also played by course evaluation. For
methodological reasons, the evaluation is carried out not
only at the end of the training but also after stages 1 and 4
of the process (Figure 3). The training process algorithm
(Figure 3) specifies evaluation under ‘Analysis.’ Such a
solution ensures that the training process is under control,
the trainee’s progress is assessed, and necessary improve-
ments in the syllabus are introduced at the appropriate
time.
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Figure 2. Safety chain in helicopter flights.
Figure 3. Algorithm of the training process in the Polish Medical Air Rescue (PMAR).
Note: ATC = aviation training center; EMS = Emergency Medical Service; ES = emergency services; FATO = final approach and
takeoff area; TMS = technical maintenance section; TRTO = type rating training organization; SFS = State Fire Service; TD =
PMAR training department.
Section 1 of this article defined the risk connected
with the extensive experience of the crews and their habits
developed while using analog systems, which gave rise to
difficulties in transferring to advanced electronic systems
in EC135 aircraft. It was assumed that the pilot oper-
ating the aircraft and the paramedic who is an HEMS
crew member would not be able to remember and use all
that is taught due to information overload. It was there-
fore decided to collect all of the necessary information
from databases. Such an approach resulted in the necessity
to train crews in searching for information, and assess-
ing it from the point of view of its value and usefulness
for defining tasks. An important change was made in the
training, consisting of the departure from conveying large
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quantities of information, i.e., a memory-based model of
teaching, in favor of a model in which the prime role
is played by independent analyses and thinking. Such
a change in the training model was possible thanks to
the purchase of a Flight Training Device (FTD) flight
simulator among the 23 EC135 helicopters. Thanks to
its capabilities, it became possible to create a simulated
environment of flight operations. It is in such conditions
that crew training is carried out. The trainees are able to
practice in an environment of situations involving varied
changes of location, meteorological, and operational con-
ditions. Due to the training model which was adopted,
it became possible to depart from the need to learn the
required information by heart in favor of training to think
in circumstances close to real operations.
Syllabuses were developed in such a way as to make
the quantity of information acquired less decisive than the
ability to make the right choices and build correct systems,
in order for the training to fulfill the following functions:
• adaptational (adapting to the technological change in
the equipment and tools available);
• remedial (making up for the gaps in knowledge due
to an assumed higher level of qualifications); and
• renovational (acquiring knowledge and professional
skills by using simple teaching techniques).
To meet such demands, a system of continuing educa-
tion was put in place, assuming that learning would take
place until the end of one’s working life.[8] The assump-
tion that difficulties would arise from a change in attitude
to the new conditions of the equipment which was made
in the initial stages of the training strategy proved to be
correct. The extensive experience acquired by the pilots in
the course of their many flights operating helicopters of
the old type led to their mistaken confidence that a trans-
fer to the new-generation helicopters would be smooth. In
fact, many experienced pilots and HEMS crew members
represented examples of the so-called tunnel-vision way of
thinking, which significantly slowed down the process of
transferring to the new type of helicopter.
3. Training: structure and content
After weighing all the risks involved, a four-stage strategy
of training pilots and HEMS crews was developed. To fully
implement the curriculum, it became necessary to extend
the training to other internal company units (engineering)
and external ones directly connected with implementing
HEMS tasks (the State Fire Service, medical dispatchers).
Training PMAR pilots comprised four stages:
• Stage 1: introductory training. Implemented over
5 days, during the period which directly precedes
referring pilots for the course designed to attain a
TR EC135 license. It was planned as a theoreti-
cal foundation course acquainting the trainees with
the construction of the aircraft, its layout, and the
glass cockpit philosophy, as well as the ability to
use the digital devices showing flight parameters,
the work of the engine, etc. This is a particularly
significant skill for the personnel that had hitherto
used only analog devices. The ‘language of the heli-
copter’ (warnings, cautions) consists of the ability to
understand the messages generated by the system of
the helicopter and to convey them to the crew on dis-
play screens of digital devices, and the procedure of
starting and turning off the engines.
• Stage 2: training to attain TR EC135 type rating. The
cycle consists of two modules: a 2-week theoretical
module, and a practical 3–4-week module using a
helicopter and a simulator. In addition, a 2-h prac-
tical training course is planned at this stage which
practices making category A takeoffs and landings.
• Stage 3: ground training. A 1-week theoretical train-
ing course with practical elements, the objective of
which is for the pilots to acquire the skill of using
the avionic possibilities of the new helicopter in a
versatile and appropriate way. In addition, the course
teaches operations connected with using ground pro-
cedures (the kinds and scope of servicing, taking the
aircraft out of the hangar, towing and storing it in a
hangar). At this stage of training, the pilots are also
acquainted with the scope and character of the mis-
sions that they will perform as part of their refresher
course.
• Stage 4: refresher course. Stage 4 takes place after
stage 3 and after the TR EC135 rating has been
entered on the pilot’s license. The main objective
of this part of the course was to obtain experience
in performing HEMS operations using the EC135
helicopter both during the day and at night.
Parallel training courses were a significant element of
the syllabus. They comprised simultaneous, different-level
training of occupational groups directly connected with
using the aircraft (pilots and paramedics), who signifi-
cantly facilitate the co-operation of HEMS crews. As the
algorithm in Figure 4 shows, much time in the training
process was devoted to crew co-operation, in particular
to communication among the crew members. This time
is necessary for the crew to be able to predict their own
reactions, evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, foresee
each other’s reactions, and learn what kinds of comments
are acceptable, whether it is safe to express criticism or
objections, or to speak one’s mind.[9]
4. Technological factor: selected elements
The complexity of the systems in the EC135, together with
the fact that they had not been part of the equipment of
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Figure 4. Algorithm of the risk management process.
the Mi-2 plus helicopter and are very different from the
Mi-2 plus systems, could have led to errors in the opera-
tion of the new helicopters. To avoid this, stage 4 of the
HEMS pilot and crew training was extended and the pro-
cess was built up with teaching the possibilities of modern
technology.
While developing the technological assumptions for
the new helicopter, it was decided to reduce the potential
possibility of a dangerous error occurring by using the con-
cept of equipment or human redundancy.[10] Examples of
redundancy on EC135 helicopters are as follows:
(1) The central panel display system (CPDS), e.g.,
• focusing the pilot’s/pilots’ attention on the
multi-function digital screen display;
• ability to transfer recommendations from a
faulty screen to an operational one.
(2) The pilot’s and co-pilot’s trim tabs. The pilot’s tab
has priority and will override the co-pilot’s con-
trol. When the trim tabs on the control stick in the
pilot’s and co-pilot’s positions are simultaneously
placed in opposite directions, the co-pilot’s trim tab
does not work.
(3) Many devices are duplicated, e.g., the CPDS sys-
tem includes two caution and advisory displays
(CAD) and two vehicle and engine monitoring dis-
play (VEMD) screens. If there is a fault in the
CAD, the VEMD can take over the display of some
parameters.
(4) The redundancy effect is also illustrated by, e.g.,
• two ‘main’ engines;
• two autopilot channels;
• two aerodynamic centrals;
• dual spark igniters (for igniting two parts of the
electrical ignition unit);
• two fuel pumps;
• two oil pumps for lubricating the main transmis-
sion;
• two hydraulic pumps, etc.
Taking steps to prevent the negative effects of commit-
ting errors was, moreover, attained by using a special
system which does not accept incorrect command signals.
The flight management system is an example. Feeding it
incorrect data, e.g., wrong map coordinates or radio fre-
quencies, is impossible if they exceed logically acceptable
ranges.
5. Human factor: selected elements
The analysis of the human factor was indispensable for
conducting the whole training, and particularly for carrying
out the syllabus assumptions of stage 4, which focused on
acquiring skills in HEMS operations. In spite of the exten-
sive experience of the crews being trained, it was difficult
for them to manage stressful situations.
The specifics of the tasks performed during HEMS
missions, i.e., the constant pressure of time, takeoffs and
landings in unknown terrain, night operations, and frequent
exposure to traumatic events, prompted PMAR personnel
to prepare courses to put special emphasis on stress-related
issues. The conclusions following the evaluation of risk
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and the experience acquired thanks to the many years of
using Mi-2 helicopters and participating in HEMS mis-
sions confirmed the fact that both HEMS pilots and crews
are exposed to two kinds of stress which can be referred to
as brief and traumatic.
The former kind of stress generates a brief state of
tension in the helicopter crew. Although it occurs fre-
quently, it rarely leads to adverse health effects. This kind
of stress is primarily related to HEMS helicopters landing
in unknown terrain. An analysis of the kind of incidents
generating brief stress in HEMS crews has shown that it
is not obstacles like poles, trees, or uneven ground that
increase the level of stress above an acceptable level,
but people present on the landing site. Curiosity reduces
people’s natural instinct of self-preservation, leading to
potentially dangerous situations during helicopter land-
ings. Ways to prevent such behavior were included in stage
4 of the training syllabus, i.e., refresher courses. This kind
of stress is magnified by night conditions under which it is
possible for the new EC135 helicopters to fly. Taking into
account the extremely difficult and dangerous character of
night operations, analytical, planning, and organizational
steps were taken to perform such operations safely. The
first element of the plan was to sign an agreement that
PMAR would cooperate with the fire service units included
in the National Fire Extinguishing System. In the con-
text of the problem considered, the key stipulation was
that ‘in the course of joint operations, the State Fire Ser-
vice summoned by PMAR commits to making appropriate
preparations and securing specially designed places for the
landing and takeoffs of HEMS helicopters’. The other ele-
ment of the plan was to adopt and implement a system of
joint practical courses which both teach and build mutual
trust forming the foundation for working in such difficult
operations.[11]
The other kind of stress involves trauma. According
to the literature, employees of rescue operations, police
officers, firefighters, technicians in medical laboratories,
and soldiers in war zones are particularly exposed to
trauma.[12] A traumatic incident can be defined as a sud-
denly occurring situation which gives rise to fear and
panic among the people who participate in it.[13] Work-
ing under traumatic conditions and participating in them is
the bread and butter of every crew involved in HEMS mis-
sions. In the course of their university courses, the medical
personnel comprising helicopter crews are taught how to
act in a rational and professional way in such situations.
Pilots, on the other hand, are rarely prepared to operate
in such difficult circumstances. The results of the studies
available in the literature show that 5–58% of the par-
ticipants of such operations suffer from disorders due to
traumatic stress.[13] Taking this into consideration, PMAR
introduced a system of reporting incidents [14] and cre-
ated a crisis intervention team comprising psychotherapists
and a psychologist. Not only pilots but all crew members
participating in a traumatic event can count on such help.
6. Training: effectiveness
Safety concerns are becoming an increasingly significant
element of PMAR operations and management. Manag-
ing safety primarily involves predicting threat.[15] This
requires using new techniques of threat identification,
using a quantitative approach, i.e., a quantitative deter-
mination of threat probability and level of risk,[16] and
looking for patterns of appropriate behavior in such situ-
ations. Taking into account the specifics of PMAR oper-
ations, risk management is equally important in the area
of technical processes as it is in controlling the human
factor. The process of risk management is based on the
algorithms developed on the basis of Standard No. IEC
31010:2009 [17] as part of the Ministry of Science and
Higher Education research project.[18] The key and most
difficult elements of the algorithm (Figure 4) are identify-
ing threats, determining the possibility they would occur,
and deciding what potential effects they would have.
A chart showing the state of safety in 2006–2013 was
made on the basis of the data collected (Figure 5).
A good way to measure flight safety is to include the
human factor by finding the flight incident indicator in the
aspect of the human performance factor. This is calculated
with the following equation:
Hfind = hfind × 10,000F ,
where H find = human factor performance indicator, hfind
= number of incidents involving the human-related per-
formance factor, and F = flight hours.
This factor is calculated similarly to the failure rate,
which is defined as the number of accidents multiplied by
100,000 and divided by the total number of flights. The
failure rate is used to specify the state of safety in statistical
and comparative studies.[19]
An analysis of the human factor during 2006–2013
(Figure 5) shows that this indicator is much lower in the
last years of the period considered, i.e., in 2012 and 2013
(5.7 and 5.9, respectively) than in 2009 and 2008 (9.31
and 8.72, respectively). This shows that training crews in
accordance with the adopted strategy was effective.
It must also be pointed out that the state of flight safety
was satisfactory, even though the number of flights in
2009–2013 rose (Figure 6).According to the probability
theory, when the total number of flights rises, there is an
increase in the probability of human-related errors. This
assumption is proved by the values shown in the chart
(Figure 5).
Nevertheless, a closer analysis of the human-related
performance factor in 2012–2013 (Figure 5) reveals a cer-
tain disturbing phenomenon. The rise in the total number
of flights performed by the pilots and their growing expe-
rience should be accompanied by a decrease in the number
of errors. In fact, the number of errors committed leveled
off and even showed a slight increase, which is indicated
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Figure 5. Values representing safety during 2006–2013.
Figure 6. Missions performed by the Polish Medical Air Rescue during 2001–2013 by year.
by the ellipsis in Figure 5. This rise shows that there
was an increase in threat, which requires clarification and
undertaking preventive action. The analysis of the groups
of causes which led to the human-related errors during
2010–2013 throws light on this disturbing factor (Table 5).
When analyzing the data in Table 5, it must be pointed
out that at the beginning of the training there were errors in
the H4 category (procedural errors). In 2011–2013, errors
started occurring as follows:
• H1: intended departure from operational proce-
dures or regulations, the pilot’s undertaking oper-
ations from memory, not according to written
instructions;
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Table 5. Group of causes leading to aviation incidents in
the human factor (H) category and the number of incidents
during 2010–2013.
Number of incidents
Code Cause 2010 2011 2012 2013
H1 Intended action 0 1 2 0
H2 Lack of qualifications 0 5 0 1
H3 Errors in
communication
0 1 0 1
H4 Procedural errors 1 0 2 2
H5 Ineptness 0 0 0 0
• H2: incorrect work of the crew (the pilot) caused
by lack of knowledge or skills related to lack of
experience;
• H3: inadequate communication, errors in task inter-
pretation; and
• H4: unintended departure from observing procedures
or regulations.
The pilot’s growing experience led to a fall in the
H2 group of errors to 1 in 2013, but in the course of
further training did not contribute to an elimination of
mistakes in the H1, H3, and H4 groups. The emergence
of such errors is connected with the EC135 pilots reach-
ing the number of individual flight numbers of 300, and
then 700 h. The 300-h line in the graph (Figure 5) reveals
the emergence of the phenomenon of ‘own interpretation.’
Over time, the pilots and crew members gain the convic-
tion that the knowledge and experience they have gained
entitle them to make their own interpretation of the task
obtained and the commands it involves. On the 700-h bor-
derline, another group of threats appears; it is caused by
routine, i.e., confidence due to long experience connected
with a weakening of awareness of the existing threats dur-
ing frequently repeated operations.[20] This is a dangerous
phenomenon, which has caused many accidents and air-
craft catastrophes. The emergence of such errors should
be predicted when the pilots approach the 300-h and then
the 700-h thresholds. Appropriate prevention introduced
in accordance with the risk management algorithm should
reduce this risk. Human error, however, is inscribed into
our nature and cannot be totally eliminated. It is impor-
tant that the results of committing mistakes should not be
negative.[20]
According to the thesis presented, in spite of appro-
priate prevention, routine-related errors will occur. They
should be eliminated by introducing extra training and, if
necessary, by temporarily suspending pilots, paramedics,
or HEMS crew members from their duties at work.
7. Conclusions
Taking into account the training process hitherto conducted
and the ongoing operation of the EC135 helicopter, it can
be stated that PMAR operations have reached an accept-
able level of safety: there has been no harm to people or
property, while the number of missions has increased. The
risk connected with aircraft and with the work done by ser-
vices involving direct aircraft support is under control and
has been lowered to an acceptable level.[21] As the human
factor is also the weakest link in PMAR operations, it was
assumed that an acceptable level of risk is reached if the
number of errors connected with the human factor per year
decreases to 4. At that level of risk it is possible to imple-
ment preventive measures to counteract the occurrence of
unfavorable aircraft incidents.
In summary:
(1) Adopting an appropriate strategy of training
PMAR crews to work on the new type of aircraft
led to reaching the objectives, both in the quantita-
tive and qualitative aspects and to completing them
in the time that had been planned.
(2) Preparing HEMS crews with no loss of health or
life and without flight incidents which would dam-
age equipment reached an appropriate level for
performing operational tasks using the new type of
helicopter both during the day and at night.
(3) The correctly performed potential risk analysis,
preparing an appropriate number of qualified air-
craft instructors, and using a flight simulator at
each stage of the training, ensured a high level of
the courses, and proved that there is no need to
change the syllabus.
(4) The strategy to extend the scope of courses to
include external EMS units, in particular the State
Fire Service and the Mountain Volunteer Search
and Rescue Service, raised the safety level and
limited crew stress when performing landings in
unknown areas and at night.
(5) The necessary, uninterrupted process of hiring new
pilots, paramedics, and drawing conclusions from
the courses and from the crews’ fieldwork led to
a change in attitude and to awarding a particularly
important status in the training to issues connected
with human resource management. Now, courses
preparing aeromedical crew resource management
(ACRM) instructors include pilots, paramedics,
and doctors.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
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[8] Cieślak A. Rozwój teorii i praktyki kształcenia ustaw-
icznego [The development of the theory and practice of
lifelong learning]. Warszawa: WSiP; 1981.
[9] Beaty D. Pilot – naga prawda: czynnik ludzki w katastro-
fach lotniczych [The pilot – naked truth: the human factor
in aviation catastrophes]. Warszawa: W.A.B; 2012.
[10] Smalko Z. Studium terminologiczne inżynierii bez-
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